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From the static eyes on, control rights were the structures and situations; 
However, from the dynamic eyes on, they were rings of procedures and mechanisms 
of control rights transferring. As the "genes" of modern companies, control rights' 
having been effectively distributed was the key and core of solving the corporate 
governance, and strengthening the control rights mechanisms was the practical 
choices and strategic trends of improving the corporate governance. In Chian stock 
market, lots of list companies were charged by large shareholders. To control and 
reduce the cost of large shareholder governence, it defines to the market for corporate 
control in China. So this paper will focus on the siginificance of cultivating a an 
effcient market of corporate control, which can carry out exterior mechanism and 
resource allocation function, in fact, about performance of the market of corpotae 
control in China. 
The number of event of corporate control transferring increased at 70% during 
last few years. But in the back of this flourishing phenomena, it show out a low 
performance market. The special sotck property strctures and incomplete law and 
system environment decide the same opportunistic conduct operated by both 
corporate control suppliers and buyers and made the stock market become only 
financing approach for list companies instead of efficient carrier of market for 
corporate control. 
    After comparing The Event Studies and The Accouting Studies, considered of the 
problem of information nosies and distortion, this paper applies the later one to do 
empirical analysis. According to researches done before, this paper absorbes eight 
financial index to value corporate performance. Using the factor analysis method, four 
main component were get and the socore for the list companies which change their 
large shareholders can be calculated. Analysis the changing trend of their scores, it’s 
shown that after the transferring, the performance seems to rebound strongly in next 
year but soonly get down. Because of useless of market for corporate control, 
corpotae takeover didn’t equal to threat. The transferring didn’t change the real 














mechanism and the optimization of social resource allocation hasn’t work very well. 
    When it mentions about the reboud in the next year after the transferring, it need 
to know the real structure of return source. The contribution made by profit from main 
operations is just a small part of the increase and it cann’t maintain. In contrast, 
durative investment income and non-operating revenue play important roles in the 
rebound. So earning management conduct after corporate control transferring were 
notable and its two popular way are capital reorganization and non-opreating revenue. 
In conclusion, “Wealth Transfer Hypothesis” adapt to China corporate control market. 
The transferrings were just wealth allocation game, frome one large sharrholder to 
another one, with no real social weath producing. The great loss and the cost of 
transferrings are accepted by minority shareholders. 
    According to empirical and theory analysis, it’s recommended that the stock 
innovation practised now is good to ameliorate stock property structures which 
exsited for long time. Also to improve the efficiency of performance valuation system 
and law restriction and the functions of directorate are useful ways to meliorate the 
market for corporate control in China. 
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平的高低划分为 1－6级），这还不到“及格”线，其中达到 3级的只有 2.15%，


































家公司业绩将由盈利转为亏损。其中 ST 江纸（600053）当年实现净利润 1.05 亿
元，每股收益由上年亏损 2.84 元大幅提高到盈利 0.65 元。而该公司扭亏的功臣
并不是主业，而是 2004 年公司转回的 3.25 亿元减值准备。若没有减值准备转回
的鼎力相助，公司当年将亏损 2.01 亿元，同时会因三年连亏而被暂停上市。 
除绩差公司有利用非经常性损益粉饰利润的冲动外，部分绩优公司也会以此
增厚业绩。如一家中小板公司以 12.21 元的价格发行新股，按全面摊薄每股收益
0.75 元计算，发行市盈率仅为 16.19 倍。但该公司每股非经常性损益高达 0.23
元,扣除非经常性损益后的每股收益为 0.52 元，若以此计算,公司发行市盈率达




































首先，从 2006 年已经公布年报的 29 家上市公司情况来看，尽管只有 4家出
现亏损，但是从税前利润同比变化情况来看有 14 家利润出现下滑，占已公布年
报公司的 48%。 
其次，从已经公布业绩预告的上市公司情况来看，截至 1 月 25 日共有 564
家公司发布业绩预告，其中预增 133 家、预减 102 家、续盈 6 家、续亏 81 家、
首亏 147 家、扭亏 85 家、略增 9 家以及略减 1 家。经计算业绩出现下滑（包括
续亏、预减、首亏和略减）的有 331 家占总预告数的 58.69%。另外，对比 2003
年、2004 年上市公司亏损的 A股 133 家和 172 家的数字，目前预亏上市公司 228
家，已经超过 2003 年、2004 年。而从 2005 年三季度季报业绩亏损的 A 股公司
数量达到 234 家的情况来看，今年上市公司亏损面扩大已成定局。 
再次，从市场整体情况来看，2005 年 3 季度每股收益同比出现下滑公司为
743 家，占全部上市公司数的 54.79%。如果选取较长的时点来看，从 2003 年开
始到 2005 年三季度全部行业的每股收益增长率、净资产收益增长率等数据指标
来看，出现显著的下滑趋势。可见市场整体业绩从 2003 年就已经见顶滑落，只











































（600652）为例，从 1996 年 6 月延中实业持有该上市公司 4.999％的股份，到
大港油田 1998 年一路增持至 10.0116%，到 2000 年，明天科技与同达网络（同
属明天系）持有 5％的股份，到 2002 年，百科药业与其第三大股东新理益持有
5.08％的股份，围绕爱使股份的控制权争夺一波接一波。在此过程中，延中实业
用 3500 万元的收购成本退出套现 8000 万，二级市场获利 4500 万，关联交易收
益难以统计；大港油田用 2.1 亿的收购成本，退出套现 3亿，二级市场获益 0.9
亿元，关联交易获益 700 万元；明天系 2000 年收购成本 1.72 亿，现市值约 1.82
亿，明天控股在二级市场获益 1000 万，关联交易实现利润 2290 万元。截止 2001
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